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BOOK REVIEW
SUPER CHIEF. By Bernard Schwartz.1 New York: New York University
Press. 1983. Pp. xiii, 853. $29.95.
KENNETH STARR*
For a tour d'horizon of the landmark decisions of the Supreme Court
during the sixteen year tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren, it would be diffi-
cult to match Professor Bernard Schwartz's impressive book. The author has
painstakingly set out with great clarity the decisional process leading to the
opinions which the Warren Court left as a remarkable-and controver-
sial--constitutional legacy.
It was no accident that a highly popular governor of the nation's then
second largest state found himself as President Eisenhower's first appointee to
the Supreme Court. As Professor Schwartz recounts, the President-elect tele-
phoned Governor Warren in early December, 1952, only a month after the
election, and found the Governor reading in bed. The President-elect had bad
news for the nationally prominent politician who was, notwithstanding dis-
claimers to the contrary, apparently interested in moving from the Governor's
mansion in Sacramento to a cabinet post in Washington. There was, General
Eisenhower reported, no place for the Governor in the cabinet. While Gover-
nor Warren had been seriously considered for Attorney General, that post had
gone to Herbert Brownell, an able New York attorney who had managed Ei-
senhower's campaign. Like Presidents before and after him, General Eisen-
hower had chosen as his chief law officer an individual with close personal and
political ties to the incoming Chief Executive (a tradition that began when
George Washington asked his long-time friend and family lawyer, Edmond
Randolph of Virginia, to serve as the nation's first attorney general). As a
leading early opponent of Eisenhower's candidacy, Governor Warren could
scarcely have expected to be brought into the inner circle of the new Presi-
dent's Cabinet.
The news from Washington was not entirely bleak. The President-elect
indicated that he intended to offer Warren the first vacancy on the Supreme
Court. According to Chief Justice Warren's memoirs, General Eisenhower
stated, "That is my personal commitment to you."'2 This commitment appar-
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ently was not the result of any political obligation or deal. At the 1952 conven-
tion, Governor Warren had not been quick to release the California delega-
tion's votes to Eisenhower,3 and President Eisenhower in his memoirs stated
flatly: "I owed Governor Warren nothing."4
Not surprisingly, a single telephone conversation under the pressing cir-
cumstances of a government in formation lacked the specificity of careful con-
tract negotiations. Thus, and significantly for purposes of what was to tran-
spire within the year, the Eisenhower-Warren phone conversation did not
focus on whether the "first vacancy" was any vacancy on the Court, including
the Chief Justiceship. It was indeed the top judicial post in the land, however,
which became vacant on September 8, 1953, just before the convening of the
October, 1953 Term, when a seemingly healthy Chief Justice Fred Vinson
succumbed to a heart attack.
This turn of events left official Washington in a quandary. Based upon the
agreement as to the "first vacancy," Governor Warren had to leave Sacra-
mento for the third-ranking job in the Department of Justice, Solicitor Gen-
eral. In a luncheon meeting in Washington with Attorney General Brownell,
Governor Warren had agreed in June, 1953 to accept this important but politi-
cally less visible post to build up his legal credentials for appointment to the
Court. "It had been some time since Warren had actively practiced law, and
Brownell said that the President believed that service as Solicitor General
would be valuable prior to membership on the Supreme Court" (p. 2).
If history had taken the intended course and the California prosecutor-
politician indeed had served in the crucible of the Solicitor Generalship for a
season, Earl Warren would have stepped into the Chief Justiceship with a pro-
fessional dimension indisputably distinct from that of a public official steeped
in state politics and government. The effects of a sojourn as chief Supreme
Court advocate for the United States government in the Eisenhower Adminis-
tration are entirely unknown and unknowable, and it is idle to speculate as to
what, if any, consequences would have flowed from Earl Warren's serving as
President Eisenhower's advocate in the Supreme Court. After all, Justice Rob-
ert Jackson, in a well-remembered observation, indicated that the position he
had taken as Attorney General in support of the constitutionality of the Lend-
Lease program was simply the position of an advocate and not reflective of his
own views."
In being swept from a career in state and national politics to what Profes-
sor Schwartz repeatedly refers to as the Marble Palace, Earl Warren had no
occasion, other than in avocational thoughts, to develop views as to the role of
the courts in a representative democracy. Indeed, the Governor's political phi-
3. G. WHITE, EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 138 (1982).
4. D. EISENHOWER, MANDATE FOR CHANGE: THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 228
(1963); see also J. POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA
152 (1979).
5. J. GUNTHER, INSIDE USA 18-20 (1947).
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losophy was not entirely clear; in 1947, one well-known non-legal observer re-
marked about then Governor Warren: "[H]e has the limitations of all Ameri-
cans of his type with little intellectual background, little genuine depth or
coherent political philosophy; a man who has probably never bothered with an
abstract thought twice in his life. . . ." More charitably Professor Schwartz
notes: "There was no hint of greatness in the first phase of Warren's career.
An honest, hard-working and vigorous law-enforcement officer, there was little
to distinguish Warren from his peers. . . . The early Earl Warren was more
than most a product of his upbringing and surroundings" (p. 7).
Governor Warren may have come to Washington in the autumn of 1953
with few, if any, jurisprudential or constitutional views. Professor Schwartz
does not suggest the contrary. In fact, the author seems to conclude that, with
the magisterial exception of Brown v. Board of Education,' the early terms
showed little of Warren's reformist inclinations or of any particular predilec-
tion (p. 127). The politician-turned-judge even deferred to the senior Justice
Hugo Black, who in effect presided at the early conferences attended by the
new Chief Justice. In the early going, save for the strong leadership displayed
in the school desegregation cases, Earl Warren was getting his judicial sea
legs.
In the early pages, the author recounts the intellectual ferment stirring
the Court at the time of the new Chief's arrival. He describes accurately, but
a bit summarily, the cleavage between Justices Black and Frankfurter and the
differing views of judicial philosophy underlying their profound disagreement:
To Frankfurter, restraint was the proper posture for a nonrepresentative judi-
ciary, regardless of the nature of the asserted interests in particular cases. In
all cases, Frankfurter felt, "Humanity is not the test of constitutionality." On
the contrary, as he once wrote Justice Murphy, "a sensitive humanitarian who
has taken the oath as a judge ... does not yield to his compassion, or...
think his compassion is the measure of law."8 [Pp. 42-43.]
Frankfurter felt, the author correctly observes, a close spiritual kinship
with Holmes, who in dissent had fought the intrusion of judicial predilections
into the process of determining whether legislative enactments passed constitu-
6. It is a matter of lively debate whether as of his appointment in 1953, Earl
Warren had a developed judicial philosophy. Professor Schwartz does not say that
Warren did, but Professor G. Edward White in his recent study of Earl Warren argues
that throughout his public life Chief Justice Warren had "a deep commitment to a
general set of principles that were consistent in themselves." G. WHITE, supra note 3,
at 4. Professor White concluded that as a judge, "Warren developed a theory of judg-
ing that combined an ethical gloss on the Constitution with a activist theory of judicial
review." Id. at 6. This theory came with time, however. Upon ascending the bench,
Earl Warren was, at bottom, a man comfortable with the exercise of power and a firm
believer in the capacity of government to solve problems. These problems included the
achievement of social justice. "His sympathy for persons oppressed by special interests
ran deep: he was a Progressive first and a Republican second." Id. at 154.
7. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
8. S. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 86 (1974).
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tional muster.' Frankfurter's admiration for Holmes was admittedly almost
without bounds. "You have a right to deem my attitude toward Holmes close
to idolatry, certainly to reverence" (p. 42).
Justice Black would have none of this. Deference to Congress was, in ef-
fect, an abdication of judicial responsibility. Black's avowed activism was sim-
ply giving vent, in his view, to the duty of judges to provide their "honest
judgment" as to the constitutionality of an act of Congress.
After laying out the intellectual dividing line between Black and Frank-
furter, the author enthusiastically embraces Justice Black's constitutional
views and dismisses Frankfurter's contribution. Professor Schwartz cannot be
accused of masking his own jurisprudential preferences, for he rejects out of
hand the Holmes and Frankfurter traditions with the following pronouncia-
mento: "In the end, it was Black, not Frankfurter, who best served the Court
and the nation. With all his intellect and legal talents, Frankfurter's judicial
career remained a lost opportunity" (p. 48).
Why is it, the reader presumes to ask, that Frankfurter's career
floundered on the shoals of missed opportunity. Professor Schwartz does not
blanch: Justice Black was for individual liberties as against the powers of gov-
ernment."0 In contrast, "no matter how he tried to clothe his opinions with the
Holmes mantle, there was an element of shabbiness in the results reached by
Frankfurter in too many cases" (p. 48). The anti-libertarian results of the phi-
losophy of restraint are thus simply too much for Professor Schwartz to bear,
regardless of the powerful intellectual justification for a restrained judiciary in
a representative democracy, the precise basis of the great Holmes dissents.
The relevance of this dispute between the intellectual titans of the Court
is powerfully demonstrated by the author. Chief Justice Warren was feeling
his way in the early days, torn between these two competing schools of
thought. The uncertainty and vacillation were not to remain for long:
Not until the 1956 term, did Warren finally make the choice. When he did, it
was to reject the philosophy of judicial restraint and join hands with Black.
From then on, it was Warren who was to lead the Court, with Black as a
principal ally, in rewriting so much of the corpus of constitutional law. [pp.
47, 49.]
Thus began the modern constitutional revolution."1
9. Id.; see F. FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES AND THE SUPREME COURT
26-29 (1961); F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT
192 (1962); THE CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER 189-90 (S.
Konefsky ed. 1949); Frankfurter, The Early Writings of O.W. Holmes, Jr., 44 HARV.
L. REV. 717, 723-24 (1931).
10. See G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 424-25
(1977); V. HAMILTON, HUGO BLACK: THE ALABAMA YEARS 301-08 (1968); G. WHITE,
THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 331-36 (1976).
11. See R. MCCLOSKEY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 322-66 (1972); B.
SCHWARTZ & S. LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT 199-213 (1983); G. WHITE,
supra note 10, at 317-68. See generally P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION,
[Vol. 49
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The new Chief Justice was warmly received by the Brethren in the early
days. The Justice destined to be the new Chief's nemesis, Felix Frankfurter,
was impressed by the style and manner of the Court's newest member: "I like
him as a human being. He is agreeable without being a back-slapper; he is
informal but has native dignity" (p. 148). To Justice Robert Jackson, Frank-
furter wrote in April, 1954 about the new Chief's handling of a particular
matter: "[Warren] . . . showed the understanding that comes from caring for
the real responsibility that that problem implies. What a pleasure to do busi-
ness with him" (p. 148). Indeed, Justice Stewart recalls, according to Profes-
sor Schwartz, his understanding "that, when Earl Warren first came to the
Court as Chief Justice, Felix was going around Washington saying, 'This is
the greatest Chief Justice since John Marshall and maybe greater'" (p. 147).
Justice Frankfurter's benign, avuncular attitude toward the new Chief
doubtless was influenced by the fact that in the early days the new Chief was
typically in accord with Frankfurter. "[Warren] was assiduously courted by
Frankfurter, who sought to win the new Chief to his own judicial philosophy"
(p. 146). The prolific Frankfurter "bombarded Warren with notes, memo-
randa, articles and even texts intended to inculcate the Frankfurter view" (p.
149). Frankfurter, who along with Jackson was already hopelessly at odds
with Justice Black, found to his great satisfaction that the new Chief in his
first term disagreed with Black in twenty-two cases (p. 151).
The new sense of good feeling on a Court plagued with stormy relation-
ships, such as the bitter public feud between Black and Jackson, was most
dramatically evidenced in Brown. Warren, we are informed, had little trouble
in coming to a decision on the merits in Brown. Plessy v. Ferguson,2 the 1896
case holding over the first Justice Harlan's magnificent dissent that the princi-
ple of separate-but-equal comported fully with the equal protection guarantee
of the fourteenth amendment, was plainly wrong. The new Chief's views or
inclinations were not evident, however, at the time of oral argument in Brown
in December, 1953; the Chief Justice asked very few questions, leaving the
field to more active questioners such as Justices Frankfurter and Jackson. The
Chief's reticence, however, ended when the conference room doors were closed:
Until [the conference], his Brethren had found a bluff, convivial colleague,
who disarmed them with his friendliness and lack of pretension. Now they
were to learn that he was a born leader, whose political talents were to prove
as useful in the Judicial Palace as they had been in the State House. [p. 84.]
Before Chief Justice Warren's ascension, the Court had been badly frag-
mented on the fourteenth amendment issues in the school desegregation cases.
The Court was divided four to three to two in its internal councils: Justices
Black, Douglas, Burton and Minton favored overruling Plessy; Chief Justice
AND THE WARREN COURT (1970); L. LEVY, THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WAR-
REN (1972); C. LYTLE, THE WARREN COURT AND ITS CRITICS (1968); R. MASLOW,
"CODDLING CRIMINIALS" UNDER THE WARREN COURT (1969).
12. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Vinson, Justice Clark and Justice Reed favored Plessy's retention; Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson were troubled by state-imposed segregation but dubi-
tante as to the jurisprudential basis for overruling the long-standing prece-
dent. 3 Under prodding from Justice Frankfurter, the Court had put the school
desegregation cases over until the 1953 Term for reargument in order for the
deeply divided Court to consider the issues at greater leisure. As Professor
White has observed in his book on Chief Justice Warren:14
The major purpose of the reargument was to give the Justices more time to
congeal their positions on the segregation cases. Frankfurter and Jackson, es-
pecially, were fearful that an opinion that invalidated segregation but did so
in a strident or unreasoned fashion would do greater harm that the continu-
ance of the practice. 5
Time had radically altered the judicial landscape. At this juncture after
Chief Justice Vinson's death, the incumbent Chief Justice embraced the views
already espoused in conference during the prior term by four other members
of the Court. But, as is now well-known, the monumental achievement of the
new Chief Justice was not the amassing of five votes to overrule Plessy. It was,
rather, the skillful "forging of a unanimous majority for the Brown decision"
which established what Professor White refers to as Warren's "presence" on
the Court.' 6 Here in Brown was the use of power to achieve laudable social
ends. It was, in a way, like being Governor all over again:
[Brown] involved convincing others of the necessity for an arm of government
to act decisively and affirmatively where a moral issue was at stake. The elim-
ination of segregation, in [Warren's] mind, was comparable to the establish-
ment of compulsory health insurance [in California]. Both were responses to
an injustice; both sought to prevent humans from being disadvantaged
through no fault of their own.17
Justice Frankfurter was, of course, in accord with the Chief's proposed
result in Brown. The rationale, however, was quite a different matter. Perhaps
to secure unanimity among the Brethren, the Chief Justice had argued in con-
ference that state-mandated segregation carried with it the mark or badge of
inferiority; thus, anyone defending the principle of separate-but-equal would
find himself very much on the defensive. It was a useful device, and apparently
forcefully presented by Warren in conference. As Professor White has ob-
served: "Without labeling defenders of the Plessy decisions white
supremacists, he conveyed that association. This was a familiar Warren tech-
nique, the argument to induce shame."'"
13. G. WHITE, supra note 3, at 162; see generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE
(1976).
14. See Kurland, Book Review, 96 HARV. L. REV. 331-39 (1982) (reviewing G.
WHITE, supra note 3).
15. G. WHITE, supra note 3, at 163.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 165.
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Schwartz's book ably chronicles the process by which the new Chief Jus-
tice persuaded and cajoled his Brethren that the need for unanimity was para-
mount for the sake of the Court and the nation. As is now well known through
such sources as Richard Kluger's Simple Justice,' Warren secured the Jus-
tices' agreement at the initial conference to discuss the cases informally with-
out taking votes. Thus, the Chief avoided the eight Justices' freezing them-
selves into varying positions by even tentatively voting. The former Governor
had dealt long enough with legislators to have learned well the lesson of urging
one's prospective but uncertain allies to keep their options open so the desired
votes could eventually be secured without forcing an embarassing volte-face.
Professor Schwartz quotes the comments of Warren himself in this regard a
year after the Brown decision: "The fact that we did not polarize ourselves at
the beginning gave us more of an opportunity to come out unanimously on it
than if we had done otherwise" (pp. 84-85).
In the meantime, Justice Frankfurter was providing the Court with an
abundant fare of constitutional food for thought. The Justice circulated a
lengthy memorandum, reflecting apparently in large measure the laborious ef-
fort of Frankfurter's law clerk, Alexander Bickel,20 analyzing the intent of the
framers of the post-Civil War fourteenth amendment. That lengthy voyage
back in time, involving "months of plowing through the musty, near century-
old folio volumes of the Congressional Globe" resulted in the conlusion that
the legislative history of the Amendment was "inconclusive" (p. 85). That
conclusion was helpful to the anti-Plessy abolitionists, for Chief Justice War-
ren's late predecessor had argued in conference only a year earlier in Decem-
ber, 1952 that the fourteenth amendment's framers had not intended to abol-
ish segregation.
With the Court thus not swimming against a tide of adverse legislative
history, the Chief Justice urged the conference to abolish state-mandated seg-
regation on moral grounds, namely that Plessy improperly and unfairly placed
a badge of inherent inferiority upon blacks. Professor Schwartz superbly cap-
tures the spirit of Brown and much of the jurispurdence that was to follow
during the era of the Warren Court:
Warren's words [at the conference] went straight to the ultimate human val-
ues involved. In the face of such an approach, traditional legal arguments
seemed inappropriate, almost pettifoggery. To quote [Justice] Fortas . .. ,
"opposition based on the hemstitching and embroidery of the law appeared
petty in terms of Warren's basic value approach." [P. 87.]
The new Chief Justice evinced in the Court's consideration and decision
of Brown two traits that were to become hallmarks of his tenure as the Na-
19. (1976).
20. Works by Alexander Bickel include THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962); THE MORALITY OF CONSENT
(1975); POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT (1965); THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970).
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tion's highest judicial official: first, extraordinary political and interpersonal
skills of leadership and persuasion; and second, a willingness to lay down far-
reaching rules wrapped in the mantle of the Constitution, with a minimum of
concern for the "embroidery and hemstitching" of the law. The first attribute
can scarcely be gainsaid, and its value to a Chief Justice presiding over the
Court in the stormy years from Korea to the first year of the presidency of
Richard Nixon can hardly be underestimated. This characteristic would set
the new Chief Justice apart from predecessors such as Fred Vinson, whose
conference presentations were deemed by the Brethren to be shallow, and
Harlan Fiske Stone, whose abilities were unquestioned but who turned the
Justices' conferences into combative debates by always insisting upon having
the last word.
The second attribute reflected by Brown and much that was to follow in
the Warren era is what makes Earl Warren an object of such abiding interest
and debate. He was, quite simply, not a lawyer's lawyer, nor did he become a
judge's judge. He was a law giver, a reshaper and reformer of society, a zeal-
ous protector of individual interests (with certain exceptions, such as cases
involving obscenity). He was the promulgator of a moral code; a man who
"raised ethics to a high judicial art."121 His former law clerk, Professor White,
readily concedes that the Chief Justice took his own ethical judgments as a
more reliable standard than the text of the Constitution.22 He was the Na-
tion's Platonic Guardian, guided by conscience and a humanitarian zeal to
help the disadvantaged. As such, he was skeptical of modern representative
government with its uncertainties and compromises. Professor White, said it
well: "Warren's progressivism had led him to believe that legislatures were
neither 'democratic' nor 'representative'. . . . Warren had . . . been inclined
[as Governor] . . . to prefer his own solutions to social problems over those of
legislators .. ."2s
To abide always by the representative process was to blink at injustice.
Legislatures, captured by special interests and oblivious to the needs of the
disadvantaged, were not forums where fairness could reign. In contrast, the
judge, above all a politically effective Chief Justice, could root out injustice
and eliminate unfairness by opening wide the courthouse doors throughout the
nation to provide sanctuary for society's forgotten and oppressed.
Brown was in retrospect the signal event in the judicial education of Earl
Warren. It was his judicial trip on the road to Damascus, for after Brown,
"Warren became a champion of activisim. . . . He had resumed the familiar
stance of progressive champion of the public interest" (pp. 170-202). He could
be, if you will, a Super Governor with the legislature never in session, so long
as he had four other votes to support his view. Judicial power could be em-
ployed for noble, disinterested ends, carrying out a sense of personal fairness
21. G. WMTE, supra note 3, at 367.
22. Id. at 362.
23. Id. at 353.
430 [Vol. 49
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developed over years of rich experience in the world of practical affairs. This
was no arid intellectual exercise, devoid of human sensibilities, reliant upon
the process of reason and guided by restraint born of humility. It was Ameri-
can self-confidence writ large, wrapped in judicial attire, a secular priesthood
of enlightened, humane concern for the downtrodden. This was, to be sure,
heady stuff; the Governor had become overnight the Platonic Guardian for the
entire Nation, motivated only by devotion to the public good. Anthony Lewis,
who covered the Court for the New York Times, has aptly conveyed the re-
sults of the Chief's journey toward activisim: "Earl Warren was the closest
thing the United States has had to a Platonic Guardian, dispensing law from a
throne without any sensed limits of power except what was seen as the good of
society. ' 2 4
This was too much for Felix Frankfurter to bear. The disciple of Holmes
and Brandeis, Frankfurter was irretrievably bound to the modern theory of
judicial review, namely that the courts, as a non-democratic branch, should
use their extraordinary power with utmost care and caution. It is no surprise
that Earl Warren's embrace of Progressive activism through the use of judicial
power led to a deep and abiding rupture of relations with Frankfurter. The
barrage of notes and memoranda gradually abated and died, leaving in its
stead a body of embittered correspondence between Justice Frankfurter and
Learned Hand, the country's most distinguished appellate judge of the day, on
the subject of Earl Warren. 25 The letters are slashingly vituperative. Judge
Hand, the paragon of judicial temperment, wrote disparagingly to Frankfurter
as follows:
The more I get of your present Chief, the less I admire him. It is all very well
to have a man at the top who is keenly aware of the dominant trends; but isn't
it desirable to add a pinch or two to the dish of what we used to call "law."
[p. 276.]
Judge Hand referred to the Chief Justice in correspondence as "that Dumb
Swede," the "Pontifex Maximus" or "Judex Maximus" (p. 276-77).
To his credit, Professer Schwartz, notwithstanding his clear affinity for
the Warren Court, does not try to blunt the sharp blows of contemporaneous
criticism. He faithfully recounts Frankfurter's critique of Warren to Justice
Harlan: "I am afraid [Warren's] attitude towards the kind of problems that
confront us are more like that of a fighting politician than that of a judicial
statesman" (p. 274). For good measure, the author quotes Frankfurter's com-
plaint in 1963 about "present result-oriented jurisprudence" of the Warren
Court and noting the "shoddy way, professionally speaking, they are turning
out . . . cases" (p. 271).
Professor Schwartz's account suggests that things got sufficiently carried
away that in employee injury cases, "the Chief and his allies would vote in
24. Id. (quoting 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1789-1969, at 2726 (L. Friedman & F. Israel ed. 1969)).
25. See H. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 182-190 (1981).
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favor of the worker against overwhelming evidence" (p. 271). Writing Frank-
furter from London, Dean Acheson noted sarcastically that the House of
Lords had likely not heard of the Supreme Court's rule that "in negligence
cases the defendant always loses" (p. 272). Frankfurter chafed under the
Warren Court majority's insistence upon taking "uncertworthy" employer lia-
bility cases, another manifestation of the Chief Justice's insistence upon "do-
ing justice." Justice Stewart summed it up well: "If the Chief Justice can see
some issue that involves widows or orphans or the underprivileged, then he's
going to come down on that side" (p. 267). Not surprisingly, the Supreme
Court docket exploded with previously routinely denied cases under the Fed-
eral Employees Liability Act.26
The author does not pass judgment on all this, save for in the opening
pages of the book discussed above. He limits himself to reporting faithfully the
results of his prodigious digging through the contemporaneous records of the
sixteen Terms during which Earl Warren presided over the Court. For this
Professor Schwartz deserves much credit. It would be heavy baggage indeed
for a single volume to canvas the case-by-case adjudications of the Court and
then provide a critique of the numerous matters being reported. To be sure,
Professor Schwartz's role as the researcher produces moments when the reader
hungers for analysis, rather than being moved on as in a cafeteria line to the
desserts of a term already laden with an abundance of salads and entrees.
For example, Professor Schwartz reports in his matter-of-fact style on the
landmark Warren Court cases analyzing the law of federal habeas corpus,
particularly Fay v. Noia2" and Townsend v. Sain.28 The book's treatment of
these two cases is entirely descriptive in nature. No attempt is made to evalu-
ate the historical bases or analytical premises of the cases which, with Brown
v. Allen 29 decided shortly before Earl Warren's cross-country move from Sac-
ramento, transformed overnight federal habeas corpus into an important area
of federal civil jurisdiction. What is admittedly frustrating about Professor
Schwartz's silence in evaluating or critiquing such cases is that Fay, it is gen-
erally agreed, represented the most evident sort of historical revisionism by the
Warren Court in order to avoid the injustice or unfairness in one individual's
26. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc., 352 U.S. 521, 524 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Steinberg, The Federal Employers' Liability Act
and Judicial Activism: Policymaking by the Courts, 12 WILLAIETa'E L.J. 79 (1975);
Note, Supreme Court Certiorari Policy in Cases Arising Under FELA, 69 HARV. L.
REv. 1441 (1956).
27. 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (federal courts have power under federal habeas
corpus statute to grant relief even though applicant failed to exhaust state remedies by
not appealing state conviction; statute refers only to failure to exhaust state remedies
still available at time of application to federal court).
28. 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (held an evidentiary hearing is required in federal
habeas corpus cases to review state trial court ruling on admission of alleged coerced
confession, but most noted for prospective enunciation of elaborate standards governing
habeus corpus hearings).
29. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
[Vol. 49
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remaining in prison while his cohorts had been granted a new trial. In review-
ing Fay, one of the Nation's most distinguished federal appellate judges,
Henry J. Friendly of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, said:
It has now been shown with as close to certainty as can ever be expected...
that, despite the 'prodigious' research evidenced by the Noia opinion, the as-
sertion that habeas as known at common law permitted going behind a con-
viction by a court of general jurisdiction is simply wrong.30
The failures of the Warren Court to set forth principled grounds for its
far-reaching decisions have of course been fully catalogued elsewhere. Even
the Court's heartiest defenders acknowledge severe defects in its judicial
craftsmanship. Professor White, for example, has readily admitted that the
Chief Justice's "reasoning was often technically imperfect, opaque, or asser-
tive." 311 The thoughtful criticism of the late Alexander Bickel has become a
classic part of modern constitutional commentary. The Warren Court, Profes-
sor Bickel suggested, "relied on events for vindication more than the method
for reasoning for contemporary validation. '3 2 The Court, he argued, was zeal-
ously pursuing the ideal of the Egalitarian Society, as Professor Phillip Kur-
land had previously suggested,33 and the role of precedent and lawyerly analy-
sis was quite clearly of secondary importance. The sixteen-year enterprise was,
in a word, guided by faith-a secular faith in a just, humane society that
would ultimately vindicate the Court's adventure by agreement with the en-
lightened results of the Court's handiwork: "Such a faith need not conflict
with, but it overrides standards of analytical reason and scientific inquiry as
warranties of the validity of judgement."34
The ultimate evaluation of the Court during Earl Warren's tenure there-
fore depends upon the standard one applies in measuring the Court's contribu-
tion. To the extent one is comfortable with the model of Judicial Guardian-
ship, the test of the pudding is in the results-whether one agrees with the
substantive results of what the Warren Court wrought in various areas of law.
Romantic attachments to the idea of a permanent Counsel for the Public
Good, protected by the independence conferred by article III, and wielding
enormous power to bring about fairness and justice through the liberally avail-
able process of litigation, is, of course, at the base of such proposals as Profes-
sor Arthur S. Miller's iconoclastic call for a Counsel of State.3
The Guardianship approach is, to say the least, susceptible to the concern
expressed so clearly by Judge Hand in the Holmes Lectures at Harvard in
30. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 170-71 (1970).
31. G. WHITE, supra note 3, at 365.
32. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 12 (1970).
33. Kurland, Forward: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative
and Executive Branches of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REv. 143 (1964).
34. A. BICKEL, supra note 32, at 14.
35. A. MILLER, TOWARD INCREASED JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: THE POLITICAL ROLE
OF THE SUPREME COURT 297-303 (1982).
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1958:
For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guard-
ians, even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not. If they
were in charge, I should miss the stimulus of living in a society where I have,
at least theoretically, a part in the direction of public affairs.36
Ultimately, the choice comes down to whether the "embroidery and hem-
stitching" of the law is of overriding significance to the judicial process, which
in turns depends on the importance one attaches to the notion of democratic
government. For the principle that the people are sovereign, in that the electo-
ral process is the continuing excercise of bedrock sovereignty subject to the
constraints of the fundamental law of the Constitution, is at the base of the
great dissents of Holmes and Brandeis and of the modern theory of limited
judicial power. "If Holmes' theory, appealing as it is to believers in democ-
racy, is to be supplanted by Warren's it will take a reasoned demonstration. '8 7
Professor Schwartz's book makes no pretense at offering a reasoned de-
fense of the Warren Court's jurisprudence. This is history, valuable and reada-
ble, but nothing more. The first half of the book is by far the most interesting,
tracking the quick transformation of Earl Warren into the unabashedly ac-
tivist judge and the escalating ideological battle between Justice Frankfurter
and Chief Justice Warren, aided closely and effectively by Justice Brennan,
who drew many of the more difficult assignments from the Chief Justice. The
principal adherents to the philosophy of Holmes and Brandeis, Frankfurter
and Jackson, were gone by 1962. With Frankfurter's retirement, the book be-
comes much less interesting, which is by no means the fault of the author.
Frankfurter's retirement in 1962, Professor Bickel aptly states, "measurably
contracted the universe of judicial discourse."38 While Frankfurter's philo-
sophical heir, the second Justice Harlan, provided intellectual leadership for
the dwindling band of dissenters-particularly with the appointment at vari-
ous times of Justices Goldberg, Fortas, and Marshall-the book inevitably
takes on a more pronounced descriptive tone as the Court marches to its
landmark criminal procedure decisions such as Gideon v. Wainwright0 and
Miranda v. Arizona.40
The book manages to end more with a bang than a whimper, as the ac-
count turns to the final two Terms, 1967 and 1968, when Justice Black and
the Chief Justice, staunch allies in the '50's who had parted company in the
great civil rights sit-in cases of the 1960's, joined forces to achieve, at the
twilight of Warren's tenure, results that seem to be departures from the main-
stream of Warren Court jurisprudence. "During the 1967 Term, Warren and
36. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73 (1958).
37. Isenbergh, Book Review, 93 YALE L.J. 384, 391 (1983) (reviewing G.
WHITE, supra note 3).
38. A. BICKEL, supra note 32, at 4.
39. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth amendment right to counsel in criminal prosecu-
tions made obligatory on states by the fourteenth amendment).
40. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Black were to join in several decisions that were seen by some as retreats from
the activist protection of individual rights which had been the hallmark of the
Warren Court" (p. 683). Warren and Black joined to carry the day in United
States v. O'Brien,4' the draft-card burning case, to hold that the concept of
"symbolic speech" was not amply broad to bring O'Brien's activities within
the protection of the first amendment. Although the conference's result
prompted what the author calls "virtual guerilla warfare against the decision"
by the law clerks, their zeal was unrequited:
[Warren's opinion for the Court] recognized that the communicative element
in O'Brien's conduct brought the First Amendment into play. But it found
that the government had a substantial interest (not the compelling interest
Brennan had urged was necessary) in assuring the continuing availability of
draft cards which justified the law prohibiting their destruction. [pp. 684-85.]
This deference to stated governmental interest was also evident in Terry
v. Ohio,42 the stop-and-frisk case. In Terry, the Chief Justice recognized the
legitimate and strong law enforcement interest in self-protection as against the
asserted fourth amendment interests of the individual. But as an example of a
recurring theme in the book, it was Justice Brennan who supplied, as in other
decisions, much of the rationale for the Chief Justice's opinion, including re-
shaping the analysis from one of probable cause to one of reasonableness
under the fourth amendment (pp. 685-91). In fact, it would seem from Profes-
sor Schwartz's research that Justice Brennan43 provided for the Chief Justice
what Felix Frankfurter had been unable to provide, namely intellectual guid-
ance to a Chief Justice more concerned about the fairness and justice of result
that the "embroidery and hemtitching" of the law. While Professor Schwartz
refers to Justice Brennan as the Chief Justice' principal lieutenant, it would
seem more accurate, based upon the author's account of the voluminous ex-
change of notes, memoranda, and draft opinions, to view Justice Brennan as
the Chief Justice's primary legal counselor and advisor. If the Warren Court
had a "Chief Counsel," it would appear to have been, ironically, the Eisen-
hower appointee from New Jersey, not the titans of the Court, Black and
Douglas, appointed by Franklin Roosevelt.
The final Term, 1968, gave rise to the landmark fourteenth amendment
case of Shapiro v. Thompson,44 the right-to-travel case in which the Chief
Justice was in stout dissent from his longstanding allies. The issue in this case
was the constitutionality of Connecticut's one-year residency requirement for
eligibility for federally funded Aid to Families with Dependent Children.45 In
41. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
42. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
43. See generally S. FRIEDMAN & W. BRENNAN, AN AFFAIR WITH FREEDOM
(1967).
44. 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (state law restricting welfare benefits to persons who
have resided in the state for at least one year burdens the exercise of the right to
travel).
45. Id. at 623.
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an intriguing account of the decisional process in the case, Professor Schwartz
describes the fact that the case had originally been argued late in the 1967
Term. Chief Justice Warren had led the conference to a tentative vote, six to
three, in favor of upholding the state's residency requirement. Being in the
majority, the Chief assigned the opinion to himself and promptly circulated an
opinion concluding that Congress had authorized the states to impose resi-
dency requirements such as Connecticut's; that the constitutional test was the
mild form of "rational basis" scrutiny under the fourteenth amendment, and
that the authorization by Congress "has the necessary rational basis to over-
come an equal protection attack" (p. 727).
Two days later, Justice Douglas circulated a short dissent, but it was only
the harbinger of a thirty-page dissent circulated thereafter by Justice Fortas.
The Fortas opinion concluded that Connecticut's law impermissibly infringed
the constitutionally protected right to travel and denied equal protection. The
Fortas draft caused Justice Brennan deep misgivings about his expressed
agreement with Warren. Brennan switched his vote, and with Justice Stewart
remaining unsettled, the four-four split on the Court with the Term's conclu-
sion rapidly approaching led the Justices to set the case for reargument in the
1968 Term.
The reargument, heard in October 1968, the Chief's final Term, led Jus-
tice Stewart to vote with Fortas and Brennan. The vote was now five to three
in favor of striking down the statute, with Justice White abstaining. Chief
Justice Warren, in the majority the prior year, now found himself, along with
Justice Black, in dissent along with Justice Harlan.
Justice Douglas, as the senior Justice in the majority, assigned the opinion
to Justice Brennan, who authored what Professor Schwartz understatedly la-
bels "a broad opinion expanding the scope of judicial review in equal protec-
tion cases" (p. 728). Reviving the "compelling interest" standard that he had
unsuccessfully urged upon the Chief Justice in the O'Brien case the preceding
Term, Justice Brennan's draft opinion, which ultimately commanded a solid
majority, "extended the 'compelling interest' standard to cases involving 'fun-
damental rights,' such as the right to travel" (p. 728). This approach was
irretrievably far removed from the "rational basis" test employed by Chief
Justice Warren in his ill-fated circulation in the late spring of the 1967 Term.
After an abortive effort to modify the Brennan majority opinion to enable
the Chief to join, Warren stuck to his analytical guns and dissented, maintain-
ing that the appropriate test of constitutionality was the "rational basis" test
articulated in his earlier draft opinion. Justice Black switched sides once
again, joining with the Chief in attacking a constitutional revolution that had
now seemingly gotten out of hand. The creators of the revolution were, in their
final days on the Court, becoming more Burkean in disposition. Professor
Schwartz says it well:
"The Chief and the Alabaman had, of course, been the principal architects of
the constitutional edifice created by the Warren Court. But judicial revolu-
tions, too, may devour their creators. Warren, like Black, had begun to take
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exception to the tendency of some of the Brethren to expand individual rights
at the expense of essential societal interests." [P. 732.]
The latter day opinions in such cases as O'Brien and Shapiro in no way
suggest that the Chief Justice' had come to the view that the Warren Court
majority had turned into a runaway Court. The Chief's movement away from
the activism that spawned Reynolds v. Sims, 46 Mapp v. Ohio,47 and Powell v.
McCormack,48 the last a 1968 Term decision, must be analyzed case-by-case,
rather than forced into a Procrustean view that Earl Warren was, as it were,
sorrowfully repenting of the past as retirement from the bench loomed ahead.
It is, rather, a tribute both to the complexity of the personalities on the Court
and the difficulty of the issues before them that Warren-and
Black-voluntarily got off the constitutional train somewhere short of its ulti-
mate destination.
In a word, an opinion or two, inconsistent with the Zeitgeist of the War-
ren Court of the early and middle years, does not alter the conclusion, abun-
dantly demonstrated throughout Professor Schwartz's history, that Earl War-
ren was the unashamedly energetic National Guardian, protecting the losers in
a democratic process that the Governor-Chief Justice distrusted. Distrust of
democratic institutions and their untidy results on the part of a politician-
turned Chief Justice may seem at best curious and at worst incompatible with
the theory and practice of self-governance through representative institutions.
But distrust of those institutions is, ironically, perhaps to be more expected of
an eminently practical man of affairs who had spent his career only in the
executive branch of state government than those of a more academic or theo-
retical bent, such as Holmes or Frankfurter or Harlan.
We are still too close to the Warren era to draw ultimate conclusions; it is
much easier to get concurrence as to the nature and contribution of the Su-
preme Court under Marshall or Taney than under a Chief Justice who was in
office only fifteen years ago. But whatever time must pass before history
renders final judgment on the Warren Court, it will be difficult as against the
formidable voices of Frankfurter and Harlan, even if those voice are less pow-
erful than those of their intellectual forebears, Holmes and Brandeis, for legal
history not to conclude that a Court with the unbridled enthusiasm for reform
that characterized the Warren era could not, at bottom, have its charter con-
tinue for long without the sort of cathartic intervention manifested by
Roosevelt's Court-packing plan.4 Representative institutions are simply too
deeply rooted in the framework of the American experience for the long con-
tinued exercise of raw, wholesale policymaking power by a judiciary that is, by
design, the least democratic part of our governmental structure.
46. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (equal protection clause requires the districts for each
house in a state legislature to be equal in population).
47. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (exclusionary rule applicable to the States).
48. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
49. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 46-47 (1981).
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